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Non-technical summary
Individual beliefs on the drivers of success have been proven relevant for both redistributive
preferences and actual policy outcomes (e.g. related to the size and structure of the welfare
state). Hence, a better understanding of individual belief formation is desirable. Several
theoretical and empirical studies have already focused on explanations for interpersonal het-
erogeneity in beliefs (e.g. personal experience) but still our knowledge remains incomplete.
Thus, this paper provides additional insights by focusing on the role of information provided
by television as a way individuals can learn about the relationship between effort and success
in life.
To analyze empirically whether television affects beliefs, I concentrate on the case of the
former German Democratic Republic (GDR). This offers at least two advantages: First,
state-controlled mass media were used to promote the ideologies and world views of both
German states. The predominant ideologies differed considerably between Communist and
Capitalist states and comprised assumptions about the determinants of success in life and
social mobility. Second, the focus on East Germany offers the opportunity to exploit a
natural experiment on the regional availability of West German television broadcasts. While
the majority of GDR citizens was able to watch Western television, approximately 15 percent
of the population living in the Southeast and the Northeast could not receive these broadcasts
due to geographical reasons. Consequently, the decision to watch Western television has been
partly exogenous for each GDR citizen (given his or her place of residence).
The empirical analysis is based on two different data sets. I employ survey data collected
in the GDR during the late 1980s to test whether the differential access to television is
reflected in East Germans’ beliefs before reunification. Moreover, longitudinal data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is used to analyze the persistence of the Western
television effect during the 1990s. Overall, the findings indicate that exposure to Western
television broadcasts has made East Germans more inclined to believe that effort rather
than luck determines success in life. Furthermore, this effect seems to persist up to ten years
after reunification. Television and the information provided therein, thus, was one aspect of
different socialization in East and West Germany.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Individuelle Einscha¨tzungen hinsichtlich der Ursachen von Erfolg (sogenannte Beliefs) haben
sich als relevanter Erkla¨rungsfaktor fu¨r Umverteilungspra¨ferenzen sowie deren politische Um-
setzung (z.B. durch Umfang und Struktur des Wohlfahrtsstaates) erwiesen. Aus diesem
Grund ist ein besseres Versta¨ndnis fu¨r die Ursachen interpersoneller Unterschiede in den
Beliefs erstrebenswert. Zwar konnten bereits einige theoretische und empirische Studien
Erkla¨rungen fu¨r das Zustandekommen von Beliefs (z.B. perso¨nlicher Erfahrungen) liefern,
dennoch ist unser Wissen in diesem Bereich nach wie vor unvollsta¨ndig. Die vorliegende
Arbeit untersucht daher, ob Personen u¨ber das Fernsehen verbreitete Informationen nutzen,
um mehr u¨ber den Zusammenhang zwischen Anstrengung und Erfolg zu erfahren.
Die empirische Analyse nutzt die spezifische Situation in der ehemaligen Deutschen Demo-
kratischen Republik (DDR). Dies hat wenigstens zwei Vorteile: Erstens wurden u¨ber die
staatlich kontrollierten Massenmedien beider deutscher Staaten die jeweiligen Ideologien und
Weltanschauungen verbreitet. Kapitalistische und kommunistische Staaten unterschieden
sich in ihren vorherrschenden Ideologien, die zudem abweichende Auffassungen zu den De-
terminanten von Erfolg und sozialer Mobilita¨t beinhalteten. Zweitens lag in der DDR ein
natu¨rliches Experiment zur regionalen Verfu¨gbarkeit von westdeutschen Fernsehsendern vor.
Wa¨hrend die DDR-Bu¨rger mehrheitlich Westfernsehen empfangen konnten, hatten circa 15
Prozent der Bevo¨lkerung im Su¨dosten und Nordosten aus geographischen und topologischen
Gru¨nden keinen Zugang zu diesen Sendern. Damit war die Entscheidung Westfernsehen zu
schauen fu¨r den einzelnen Bu¨rger angesichts seines Wohnortes exogen vorgegeben.
Die Untersuchung basiert auf zwei unterschiedlichen Datensa¨tzen. DDR-Umfragedaten
aus den spa¨ten 1980er Jahren werden genutzt, um zu untersuchen, ob sich der Zugang
zu Westfernsehen in den Einscha¨tzungen der DDR-Bu¨rger vor der Wiedervereinigung wider-
spiegelt. Daru¨ber hinaus werden Daten aus dem Sozioo¨konomischen Panel (GSOEP) herange-
zogen, um die Persistenz des Einflusses von Westfernsehen wa¨hrend der 1990er Jahre zu
analysieren. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Ostdeutsche mit Zugang zu Westfernsehen eher
die Einscha¨tzung vertreten, dass Anstrengung anstelle von Glu¨ck entscheidend fu¨r Erfolg im
Leben ist. Dieser Effekt scheint auch bis zu zehn Jahre nach der Wiedervereinigung Bestand
zu haben. Fernsehen und die darin enthaltenen Informationen stellt damit einen Aspekt der
unterschiedlichen Sozialisierung in Ost- und Westdeutschland dar.
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1 Introduction
Individual preferences for redistribution cannot fully be explained by pure self-interest but
are also affected by fairness considerations. Voters usually want to reduce inequality as far
as it is driven by factors that are beyond individual control (such as luck or social conditions)
but reward individual effort. Individuals, however, do not exactly know to what extent a
certain level of inequality reflects differences in individual effort or is a consequence of other
factors. Therefore, people have to form and rely on beliefs about the relative importance of
effort as a determinant of success in life, for instance, when voting on redistributive policies.
In line with that, these beliefs are both related to preferences for redistribution (e.g.
Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Fong, 2001) and actual policies such
as the size and structure of the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). In contrast to
their policy relevance, our knowledge about individual belief formation is still incomplete.
The literature on belief formation suggests that individuals use available information from
various sources to learn about the rewards to effort and form their corresponding beliefs
about the drivers of success. They use, for instance, their personal experience or family
history to learn about the relative importance of effort (Piketty, 1995; Di Tella et al., 2007;
Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009).
Moreover, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that observable differences in beliefs of Amer-
icans and Europeans do not just reflect differences in personal experience but are rather a
result of political indoctrination. Convincing empirical evidence isolating the impact of in-
doctrination (such as exposure to Marxist ideas) on beliefs about the drivers of success is still
missing. This contribution wants to close this gap by analyzing if political indoctrination
via mass media has a persistent impact on beliefs.
To answer this question empirically, I test whether the exposure to West German television
and thereby to Western world views and ideologies has affected East Germans’ beliefs. The
focus on the case of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) has at least two advan-
tages: First, state-controlled mass media was used to promote the ideologies and world views
of both German states. The predominant ideology differed considerably between Communist
and Western states and also comprised assumptions about the determinants of success in
life and social mobility.
Second, by focusing on the GDR, I can exploit a natural experiment on the reception of
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Western television broadcasts. Approximately 15 percent of the population living in the
Southeast and the Northeast of the GDR could not receive Western television broadcasts.
In these regions, the strength of the over-the-air television signal was too low to receive
these broadcasts either because the nearest West German transmitter station was too far
away or because the area was surrounded by mountains. Therefore, the population in these
regions constitutes a natural counterfactual to the majority of GDR citizens who were already
exposed to Western television before reunification. Moreover, since the decision to watch
West German broadcasts was partly exogenous for each GDR citizen (given his or her place
of residence), it is possible to overcome the self-selection problem common in empirical works
on media effects.1
The empirical analysis draws on two different data sets. First, I use survey data collected
in the GDR during the late 1980s to test whether the differential access to Western television
is reflected in East Germans’ beliefs before reunification. The second part of the analysis is
devoted to the persistence of the Western television effect during the 1990s. For that purpose
I exploit longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Overall, the
findings indicate that exposure to Western television has made East Germans more inclined
to believe that effort rather than luck determines success in life. Furthermore, the effect of
West German television on East Germans’ beliefs seems to have persisted until ten years
after reunification.
This paper adds to the literature both on belief formation and on media. It is closely
related to empirical studies on the role of television which indicate that values, attitudes or
behavior are affected by information on different ways of life and world views as presented in
entertainment programs (e.g. soap operas or movies). Recent examples are cable television
in rural India which has improved women’s status by offering information about urban life
(Jensen and Oster, 2009) or access to national telenovelas in Brazil presenting mostly small
and wealthy families which has increased divorce rates (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009) and
reduced fertility (Chong et al., 2008).
So far, literature has mostly focused on the immediate impact of media on attitudes
and behavior. I provide further evidence indicating that television has also the power to
1Empirical approaches which do not use any exogenous source of variation in media access to measure
media effects usually face a self-selection problem: It is not clear whether a person has a certain attitude
because of a particular media source or whether the decision to utilize a media source is actually driven
by prior attitudes.
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persistently affect certain attitudes.
This paper further contributes to literature by relating a permanent exposure to consider-
ably different and biased media sources to beliefs about drivers of success. By this, it offers
insights into the role of political indoctrination for the formation of individual beliefs (as
suggested by Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).
Recently, the impact of Communism on individuals’ attitudes or preferences has received
much attention among economists. By focusing on the case of Germany, this literature
usually interprets differences between East and West Germans as a result of different social-
ization during the 40 years of separation (e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007; Heineck
and Su¨ssmuth, 2010). Socialization, however, is a broad and rather imprecise concept that
encompasses all differences in general life experience. Attempts to identify the impact of
specific aspects of socialization on individual beliefs (or other attitudes) have not been un-
dertaken before. This paper isolates the effect of indoctrination by state-controlled television
on beliefs about the drivers of success from the broader aspect of different socialization and
life experience in both parts of Germany. Bringing forward the argument that life experience
of the population should not differ systematically between regions with and without Western
television reception, differences between the two groups can be attributed to the impact of
Western television and the set of information provided therein.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The second section provides institu-
tional facts about television in the GDR. The subsequent section offers some insights into
the role of television for belief formation. Section 4 is devoted to the discussion of the iden-
tification strategy, the empirical approach and the data. The results are presented in section
5, followed by a discussion of potential confounding factors and further tests in section 6.
Concluding remarks are offered in section 7.
2 Institutional background: Television in the GDR
Following World War II, Germany was separated by the allied forces and in 1949 two inde-
pendent German states were founded. While these states did not differ substantially before
their separation (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007), 40 years of political and economic
division led to a strong divergence in living standards. GDR citizens suffered from economic
scarcity and political repression by the state authorities. In November 1989 the unexpected
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opening of the inner-German border by the GDR regime resulted in the merging of the
two German states, with the monetary union in July 1990 and the political reunification in
October 1990.
In both German states, the first television broadcasting corporations were founded in
1952 (e.g. Meyen, 2003). In West Germany, two public corporations were established, the
First German Television (ARD) with its constituent regional broadcasting institutions and
in 1963 the Second German Television (ZDF). The state-controlled television of the GDR
consisted of two channels, DFF 1 and DFF 2, which started their regular broadcasting in
1956 and 1969. In February 1990 the GDR parliament declared East German television to
be politically independent. Finally, in the course of political reunification, GDR television
was integrated into the system of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) though Eastern
and Western states are served by regional channels of their own.
In 1955 only 1.2 percent of the GDR households had a television set. The availability of
television, however, strongly increased in the 1960s and 1970s.2 In 1988 about 96 of 100
GDR households had at least one television set (GDR Statistical Office, various years).
The majority of GDR citizens was able to receive West German television (i.e. usually
the main public stations ARD, ZDF, and a regional broadcast station) already before reuni-
fication and had, by this, access to different information about the West and the way of life
there but also on the situation in the GDR.
However, approximately 15 percent of the GDR population living in the Northeast around
Greifswald and in the Southeast around Dresden (called “Valley of the Clueless”) could
not receive Western television (see also Etzkorn and Stiehler, 1998). In these regions the
strength of the over-the-air-signal of West German television transmitter stations was below
a certain threshold required for West German television reception either due to geographical
or topological reasons (i.e. these regions were either too far away from the next transmitter
station or surrounded by mountains).
Figure 1 illustrates the reception of the FRG television channel ARD within the GDR as
well as the 15 administrative districts of the GDR. The dark areas mark the two regions
without ARD reception that coincide almost perfectly with the district of Dresden and parts
of the districts Neubrandenburg and Rostock.
2Already in 1965 48.5 percent of all households had a television set. The share of households with television
further increased to 81.6 percent in 1975 and 93.4 percent in 1985 (GDR Statistical Office, various years).
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Figure 1: West German television reception in the GDR
The figure shows the GDR administrative districts (left) and the access to the West German
television channel ARD in the GDR (right). The quadratic dots indicate West German
transmitters, and the dark areas are the regions without access to West German television.
Table 1: Self-reported frequency of watching West German television (by
district)
How often do you watch FRG television?
District Mean Std.Dev. Median Never (in %) Obs. missings
Berlin 1.5 0.78 1 0.24 416 3
Cottbus 1.28 0.72 1 1.67 60 0
Dresden 4.30 1.23 5 63.52 734 50
Erfurt 1.40 0.76 1 1.23 641 8
Karl-Marx-Stadt 1.51 0.82 1 2.05 622 11
Leipzig 1.85 1.18 1 5.42 274 3
Magdeburg 1.35 0.72 1 1.09 542 7
Schwerin 1.47 0.91 1 1.04 191 1
How often do you watch West German television? (1) every day, (2) more than once a week, (3)
once a week, (4) less than once a week, (5) never. Source: GDR survey data collected between
November 1988 and February 1989 (provided by the Zentralinstitut fu¨r Jugendforschung).
The subsequent empirical analysis relies on the assumption that East Germans who had
the opportunity to watch West German television actually did watch it, while those without
access to Western television did not. Table 1 presents survey data on the frequency of
watching West German television collected in 1988/89 in eight of the fifteen GDR-districts.
5
The self-reported intensities of FRG television reception indicate its popularity.3 The average
respondent watched FRG broadcasts almost every day. Those from the Dresden-district,
however, watched Western television significantly less often than those living in other parts
of the GDR. Overall, 63.5 percent of the respondents living in the district of Dresden declared
that they never watch Western television.
3 The role of Western television in belief formation
In general, individuals have only an imperfect knowledge about the true relationship be-
tween effort and success in life. Consequently, they have to rely on beliefs regarding this
relationship, for instance, when voting on redistributive policies or deciding on how much
effort to put into work. To form these beliefs, individuals use (noisy) signals they receive
from different sources (ranging from own experience and learning from earlier generations to
information provided by others).
So far, both theoretical and empirical studies show that personal experience matters for
belief formation (e.g. Piketty, 1995; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009; Di Tella et al., 2007).
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) provide an alternative explanation for the observed heterogeneity
in beliefs between the United States and Europe. The authors point out that this hetero-
geneity does not necessarily reflect differences in experience or incentives4 but are rather a
result of political indoctrination. While Europeans have long been exposed to Marxist ideas
about the class system, right-wing politicians in the United States had more power to push
their own way of understanding economic opportunity.
Several empirical studies comparing popular beliefs and attitudes toward the welfare state
in former socialist countries and Western democracies indeed find systematic and persistent
differences (Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002; Suhrcke, 2001). In the case of Germany, these dif-
3West German television programs were very popular among GDR citizens both as a source of political
information and entertainment. The regime had been well aware of this popularity. In the 1960s, the
authorities took several measures to prevent the reception of West German television (e.g. removing
antennas directed to the West). In the 1970s, however, Erich Honecker stated that everyone could use
Western media sources as he or she wanted to. At the latest in the 1980s, most East Germans watched
FRG television (Stiehler, 2001).
4Alesina and Angeletos (2005) argue that any preexisting differences in beliefs between countries can be
manifested since they result in different welfare policies with different implications on incentives to exert
effort. This can explain why systematical differences in beliefs about the role of effort in income generation
can persist between the United States and European countries. Benabou and Tirole (2006) further argue
that individuals need to believe in a “just world” to motivate themselves or their children toward effort.
Therefore, they systematically distort their beliefs by (subconsciously) ignoring information indicating
the opposite.
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ferences are particularly obvious: even several decades after reunification, East and West
Germans entertain different beliefs and preferences for state intervention (e.g. Alesina and
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007; Heineck and Su¨ssmuth, 2010). In line with Marxist ideas about lim-
ited opportunities of upward social mobility in the working class, East Germans are more
inclined to believe that external forces (such as social conditions and connections) determine
individual fortunes than West Germans. These persistent differences are widely interpreted
as an overall consequence of socialization such as experience of life in a communist regime
and a planned economy as well as exposure to the Marxist-Leninist ideology in schools, at
the work-place and in mass media. Due to a considerable degree of centralization in vir-
tually all policy fields, there should be no systematic differences in general life experience
or indoctrination in schools or at work among GDR citizens. In one respect, however, the
experience of East Germans differed: while people living in the Northeast and Southeast of
the country could only watch state-controlled GDR television, most people had also access
to West German television broadcasts and the set of information provided therein.
Television as a powerful tool for politicians to disseminate their ideological ideas was used
for political indoctrination in the GDR. Consequently, the set of information provided by
both Western and Eastern television broadcasts had been biased in favor of the respective
world views and ideologies and, thus, differed considerably during the cold war.
Empirical evidence indicates that biased reporting by television affects attitudes and vot-
ing behavior. The choice of television news by individuals in the Islamic world correlates
with their attitudes toward the United States (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004): Persons watch-
ing Al Jazeera are more skeptical toward the United States than those watching CNN In-
ternational.5 Moreover, politically biased television broadcasts affect voting behavior (e.g.
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) for the U.S. and Enikolopov et al. (2011) for Russia). Existing
evidence for the GDR, however, does not indicate a successful indoctrination of GDR citi-
zens by biased television reports. Kern and Hainmueller (2009) find that access to Western
television actually increased the satisfaction with life in the GDR in the late 1980s. Despite a
more critical view on the situation in the GDR, the availability of Western television seemed
to stabilize the regime. The authors argue that Western television entertained GDR citizens
and, by this, made their life more bearable. The relevance of West German entertainment
5This finding, however, does not allow any conclusions about the causal impact of exposure to biased mass
media on attitudes since the decision to watch Al Jazeera or CNN International is likely to be driven by
a person’s prior attitudes toward the United States.
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programs as free time activity has been emphasized by several media studies focusing on
East Germany (e.g. Meyen, 2002).
As indicated by recent empirical studies, entertainment programs have the power to change
individual attitudes or behavior (an extensive survey is provided by Prat and Stro¨mberg,
2011). Movies or soap operas expose individuals to information on different ways of life
and the characters presented in these programs serve as role models. Jensen and Oster
(2009) show that access to cable television and, thus, the opportunity to learn about the
life and status of urban women as presented in soap operas has lowered the acceptability of
domestic violence against women and son preferences in rural India. Additional evidence is
based on the reception of famous Brazilian telenovelas which present families that are usually
smaller and wealthier than the average family in Brazil. Individuals who are exposed to this
information seem to adapt the favorable assessment of smaller family sizes since the fertility
is lower (Chong and La Ferrara, 2009) and divorce rates are higher (Chong et al., 2008) in
areas where these telenovelas are available.
Given the popularity of West German entertainment programs among the population of
the GDR and motivated by recent findings regarding the role of television, I expect that West
German television broadcasts affected East Germans’ beliefs about the drivers of success in a
comparable way. By watching Western entertainment programs, GDR citizens were exposed
to world views, values and ideologies common in the West.6 The everyday confrontation
with a different world view and ideology is assumed to make people absorb at least part of
it. This should also be true for beliefs about the relative merits of effort as a determinant of
success since the Marxist and Capitalist ideology differ considerably in this issue. Though
access to West German television broadcasts does not imply a uniform effect of exposure to
Western ideas and ideology, on average East Germans who received the information might
be expected to entertain beliefs that are different from those citizens who had only access to
the views provided by GDR television.
Moreover, beliefs that have been built up over decades are likely to remain relatively
stable over time (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009). Thus, differences between East Germans
6While objective information about the possibilities of upward mobility can be also presented in the news,
East Germans might even learn more about - and probably adopt - Western ideas about social mobility
and income generation by watching movies or soap operas in which characters get promoted due to
their effort or experienced upward mobility e.g. during the economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s
(“Wirtschaftswunder”). In addition to West German productions also U.S. soap operas (e.g. Denver
Clan and Dallas) had been very popular among GDR citizens (Hesse, 1988).
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with and without access to West German television should not diminish very quickly once
everyone has had access to these broadcasts.
4 Empirical strategy and data
A na¨ıve econometric approach to analyze how television affects individual beliefs would be to
regress these beliefs on (self-reported) television watching. However, the choice of a certain
television broadcast may not be exogenous: if a person agrees widely with the socialist
ideology and is, thus, more inclined to share the predominant beliefs he or she might avoid
Western television broadcasts. In this case, any correlation between Western television and
beliefs cannot be interpreted as a causal effect. To overcome this self-selection problem, I
exploit the exogenous variation in regional availability of West German television broadcasts
in the GDR. Basically, my empirical strategy is to compare the beliefs of GDR citizens who
had access to Western television already before reunification with those who had not. A
similar approach has recently been applied by Bursztyn and Cantoni (2012) and Kern and
Hainmueller (2009).7
In a first step, I use survey data collected by the central institute for youth research
(“Zentralinstitut fu¨r Jugendforschung”) between November 1988 and February 1989 in eight
of the fifteen GDR districts.8 This survey covers mostly teenagers and young adults employed
in preselected production units.9 The data contains information on a range of attitudes and
beliefs as well as on socioeconomic characteristics which allow to measure the impact of
several decades of exposure to Western television on East Germans beliefs. Based on this
7Kern and Hainmueller limit their analysis on the late 1980s and offer, thus, no information on the persis-
tence of the Western television effect on particular attitudes. Bursztyn and Cantoni relate advertisement
in West German television during the 1980s to East Germans’ consumption choices after reunification.
While Western television does not affect overall consumption levels, the intensity of advertisement during
the 1980s is reflected in consumption of certain categories of goods in 1993 for East Germans who had
access to FRG broadcasts.
8These districts are Berlin, Cottbus, Dresden, Erfurt, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Leipzig, Magdeburg, and Schwerin.
9Several GDR survey data sets have been collected by the GESIS-ZA and made available for social research.
In general, one might be skeptical about the reliability of data collected by GDR institutions as the
respondents may not have revealed their true opinions due to fear of political prosecution or disadvantages
for their future life or career. However, the researchers had guaranteed anonymity by distributing the
questionnaires to a group of participants, gave them the opportunity to answer them on their own and
collected them altogether afterwards (e.g. Stiehler, 1998; Meyen, 2003). This process seemed to work as
many respondents gave critical answers e.g. to questions concerning the regime and authorities.
9
data, I estimate the following reduced form equation:
Yid = β0 + βDd + γXid + δGd + id, (1)
where the outcome variable Yid denotes the belief of an individual i living in district d.
10 This
dummy variable equals one for respondents who believe that a high level of effort pays off for
the society and also for themselves, and is zero otherwise. The main variable of interest, Dd,
indicates whether the respondent lives in a district with West German television reception.
Since the area of the GDR without access to Western television has coincided almost perfectly
with the district of Dresden, Dd is equal to a Dresden-dummy.
11 Furthermore, Xid includes
a set of individual-level controls and Gd captures several district characteristics.
After focusing on the impact of differential access to Western television on East Germans’
beliefs in the late 1980s, the second part of the empirical analysis is devoted to its persistence
during the 1990s. For that purpose, I make use of data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel. The GSOEP is a longitudinal study of private households designed to be represen-
tative for the German population. While for West Germany the survey has been conducted
annually since 1984, the former GDR was covered the first time in June 1990. The “East-
sample” includes 2,179 households with 4,453 members who were surveyed in 1990 (Wagner
et al., 2007).12
I use data from this sample collected during the 1990s to estimate the following equation:
Yidt = β0 + βDd,1990 + γXidt + δGdt + µt + idt, (2)
where Yidt is the belief an individual i living in district d holds in year t, Xidt (Gdt) denotes
a set of individual-level (district-level) controls, µt includes year fixed effects and Western
television availability in district d before reunification is indicated by Dd,1990. This vari-
able equals one if Western television reception was not already possible during the German
separation, and zero otherwise. Respondents are assigned into groups with and without
Western television based on their place of residence at the level of regional planning units
10More detailed information on the variables and the corresponding survey questions is available in Table
17 in the appendix.
11Besides the district of Dresden also parts of the districts Rostock and Neubrandenburg had no access to
Western television (see Figure 1). For the latter, however, no survey data is available.
12Further information on the GSOEP is available online at http://www.diw.de/en/diw_02.c.222508.en/
soep_overview.html.
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(Raumordnungsregionen) in June 1990.13 In the baseline regression Dd,1990 is equal to one if
an individual lived in the former district of Dresden i.e. the regional planning units “Dres-
den” and “Oberlausitz” in 1990 and, thus, most likely had no access to Western television.
Consequently, the treatment status of an individual is defined by his or her place of residence
before reunification and does not change over time (i.e. is independent of an individual’s
place of residence after 1990).14
The questions referring to individual beliefs were asked in the survey waves from 1994 to
1996 and in 1999. The dependent variable Luck equals one if the respondent claims that
achievement in life is mainly a matter of luck, and is zero otherwise.
Table 2: Summary statistics - Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (3)
Whole sample Dresden Other parts of the GDR Difference
Mean Standard Obs. Mean Standard Obs. Mean Standard Obs.
Dev. Dev. Dev.
Effort pays off
1988/89 0.5824 0.4932 3381 0.5299 0.4995 736 0.5970 0.4906 2645 -0.0671***
Luck matters for success
1994-99 0.221 0.415 13204 0.250 0.433 1385 0.218 0.413 11819 0.0323***
1994 0.206 0.404 3085 0.251 0.434 370 0.210 0.408 3455 0.0458**
1995 0.194 0.395 3014 0.243 0.429 342 0.199 0.399 3356 0.0489**
1996 0.186 0.389 2957 0.218 0.414 353 0.189 0.392 3310 0.0325*
1999 0.2909 0.454 2763 0.2909 0.455 320 0.2906 0.454 3083 -0.0004
Notes: ***/**/* denotes significance of the differences of mean values between both groups at the
1%/5%/10% level.
The summary statistics presented in Table 2 already indicate that at the end of the 1980s
persons living in Dresden were less inclined to believe that effort determines success in life.
In the 1990s the differences between the two groups are smaller but individuals without
access to Western television before reunification were still more likely to ascribe success to
13Regional planning units are smaller than the regions at the NUTS 2-level but bigger than counties. In
1990 Germany had 97 regional planning units with 23 of them located in East Germany.
14I have dropped persons living in households which had moved since 1988 to avoid an erroneous assignment
of respondents. Furthermore, respondents who lived in 1990 in the regional planning unit “Greifswald-
Stralsund” are not included in the baseline regressions since they had only partly access to Western
television before reunification.
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factors exogenous to the individual (e.g. luck) than to behavior.15
Identifying assumptions
The identifying assumption is that individuals in regions with access to West German tele-
vision would not have been different from those without access if they had not had Western
television. Basically, this implies that the inhabitants of the Dresden-district should be
on average comparable to other GDR citizens except for the differential access to Western
television. I discuss this in more detail below.
Table 3: Electoral outcomes in the Reichstag election 1932 by constituency
Electoral district Voter turnout Party vote share
KPD SPD Zentrum DVP DNVP NSDAP
Berlin 80.6 33.4 27.9 4.6 0.4 6.7 24.6
Chemnitz-Zwickau 89.2 19.6 22.4 0.7 0.8 3.8 47
Dresden-Bautzen 86.4 14.3 31.1 2.1 2.9 5.5 39.3
Frankfurt (Oder) 84.2 9.6 23.5 6.3 1 9.2 48.1
Leipzig 90.5 18.7 33.1 1.1 2.2 4.5 36.1
Magdeburg 88.8 11.1 32.3 2 1.2 7.5 43.8
Mecklenburg 83.9 9.4 31.1 1.2 1.7 9.5 44.8
Merseburg 85.3 24.3 19.8 1.6 1.2 8.1 42.6
Potsdam I 85 20.1 26.7 3 0.8 9 38.1
Potsdam II 81.9 20.3 26.3 5.2 1.1 10.9 33
Thuringia 85.6 16.8 22.1 4.7 1.6 4.7 43.4
overall 85.6 18.0 26.9 3.0 1.4 7.2 40.1
Vote shares and turnout by constituencies in the election of the Reichstag on July 31th, 1932. The electoral
district of Dresden-Bautzen mainly coincides with the district of Dresden. Source: Statistisches Reichsamt
Germany (1926)
First, policy preferences or beliefs must not have differed before television broadcasting
began in the 1950s. Table 3 offers information on voting behavior at the Reichstag election
of 1932 for electoral districts located in areas that became part of the GDR after World War
II. The constituency “Dresden-Bautzen” is geographically mostly identical to the later GDR
district Dresden. The electoral data does not indicate systematic differences between Dresden
and other East German constituencies in voter turnout or vote shares of the most prominent
parties. Especially, the total vote share of the two leftist parties, the communist party (KPD)
and the social democrats (SPD), accounts for 45.4% in Dresden-Bautzen, which is almost
identical to the average of 44.9% in all East German districts, although the distribution of
votes between these two parties differs somewhat.
Second, both groups should be comparable with respect to other characteristics which
15The complete summary statistics are available in Table 15 and 16 in the appendix.
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may have an impact on individual beliefs. If, for instance, the economic conditions have
been different in regions with and without Western television, beliefs about the relevance
of effort may simply reflect different economic opportunities faced by individuals in each
region.16 Therefore, Table 4 compares the Dresden-district with other parts of the GDR.
Indeed Dresden is - compared to the GDR-average - more industrialized, and its inhabitants
seem to have a stronger interest in culture as indicated by the higher share of theater visitors.
To take these observable differences between the Dresden-districts and other parts of
the GDR into account, the baseline regressions include several district characteristics (such
as population density, share of agricultural and industrial employment) and the regional
unemployment rate after reunification. Moreover, in section 6 several additional control
variables are included which account for alternative explanations for different beliefs. The
robustness of the results is further tested by varying the control group since Table 4 indicates
that the choice of districts which serve as a comparison group for Dresden may be crucial
for the empirical analysis.
A further challenge to my identification is migration since this raises the possibility of
self-selection. Spatial mobility in the GDR, however, was very low during the 40 years of its
existence. This was mainly a consequence of the central-planned economy with the strong
regional specialization on certain industries that hampered the mobility of workers. Beyond
that the GDR faced a considerable housing shortage that further limited mobility.
Table 5 presents official statistics on population movements by district for the year 1988.
There were some internal population movements with Berlin attracting people at the costs
of most of the other districts. In general, a considerable part of all movements took place
within districts. In Dresden-district these movements account for nearly 55 percent. In
1988 the net population outflow by district ranged from 0.52 to 1.54 percent of the total
population, with Dresden being located at the lower end of this range.
16Dresden was an important industrial region already before World War I and this might have given it a
better start after reunification. The traditional industries in Dresden (as well as other parts of Saxony,
Berlin, and Magdeburg) established before 1945 were more likely to have a comparative advantage than
the new “planned industries” which had mainly been established as substitutes for industries located in
the FRG (Grundmann, 1997). Then, individuals from Dresden would have had a better starting position
after the reunification and might conclude from their relative favorable economic situation that effort
pays off.
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Table 4: Comparison of GDR-districts
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (3) (1)-(3) (4) (1)-(4) (5) (1)-(5) (6) (7) (6)-(7)
Dresden GDR with (p-value) excl. Berlin (p-value) Saxony (p-value) Eastern GDR (p-value) Valley GDR (p-value)
Western television
Population density 254 408.25 -154.25 156.82 -97.18 285 -31 168.67 -85.33 146.33 408.25 -261.92
(0.5534) (0.0017) (0.3193) (0.3292) (0.6226)
Female population 52.6 52.01 0.59 51.97 -0.63 52.85 -0.25 51.84 -0.7573 51.6 52.01 -0.41
(% district pop.) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.4120) (0.3354) (0.3193)
Working age population 62.9 65.03 -2.13 64.81 1.91 63.75 -0.85 64.87 1.91 64.63 65.03 -0.4
(% district pop.) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3656) (0.1508) (0.6049)
High educated workers 20.6 20.1 0.5 18.93 1.67 18.85 1.75 18.85 -1.67 20.17 20.1 0.07
(% working pop.) (0.6894) (0.0009) (0.5177) (0.1568) (0.9796)
Relative Labor Income 99 101.08 -2.08 100.91 1.91 98.5 0.5 103 4 98.67 101.08 -2.41
(GDR average 1¯00) (0.0739) (0.1249) (0.7952) (0.4015) (0.2928)
Industrial employment 42.8 37.39 5.41 38.49 -4.31 44 -1.2 40.07 -2.73 29.27 37.39 -8.12
(% total empl.) (0.0501) (0.1039) (0.8187) (0.6672) (0.1908)
Agricultural employment 8.1 11.19 -3.09 12.12 4.02 7.15 0.95 10.09 2.8 16.53 11.19 5.34
(% total empl.) (0.0806) (0.0190) (0.5604) (0.4306) (0.0000)
Industrial production 10.7 7.01 3.69 7.15 -3.56 10.15 0.55 8.5 -2.2 5.27 7.01 -1.74
(% GDR ind. prod.) (0.0062) (0.0135) (0.8536) (0.3886) (0.5066)
Hospital beds 95.7 99.22 -3.52 97.71 2.01 105.8 -10.1 83.67 -12.03 95.97 99.22 -3.25
(per 10,000 inhabit.) (0.3879) (0.6224) (0.5842) (0.1403) (0.6979)
Theater visitors 0.0019 0.0015 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0014 0.0005 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0018 0.0015 0.0003
(% district pop.) (0.0189) (0.0015) (0.0340) (0.0820) (0.3634)
Comparison of mean values for treatment and control groups. The treatment group includes either (1) Dresden or (6) all districts without full access to West German television (Dresden,
Neubrandenburg, and Rostock). Sources: GDR Statistical Office, information on labor income and share of working population with university degree from (Kind, 1997).
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Self-selection of individuals into regions with and without Western television may already
have occurred at the beginning of television broadcasting in the 1950s. Population move-
ments between 1953 and 1957 seem, however, not to be driven by current or expected future
reception of Western television. Dresden, where these popular broadcasts were not available,
experienced a net inflow, whereas seven districts faced a net population outflow.
Table 5: Internal and external migration in the GDR 1988/89
Internal migration Cross-border migration (1989)
net outflow % within net outflow gross emigration emigrants
District 1953-1957 (%)∗ districts 1988 (%)∗ (%)∗
Berlin 33683 2.62
Cottbus -1.48 49.22 0.99 13516 1.53
Dresden -0.15 54.54 0.70 46017 2.62
Erfurt 0.73 50.85 0.66 20445 1.65
Frankfurt -3.61 36.56 1.54 10788 1.51
Gera -0.34 51.99 0.83 15632 2.11
Halle 1.19 52.14 -0.93 27319 1.54
Karl-Marx-Stadt 3.07 61.47 0.52 40347 2.17
Leipzig -0.31 44.82 0.97 30654 2.25
Magdeburg 0.84 52.50 0.74 14761 1.18
Neubrandenburg 2.70 41.34 1.33 4590 0.74
Potsdam -3.19 42.45 1.10 17026 1.52
Rostock -0.55 46.29 1.09 11279 1.23
Schwerin 1.45 46.02 1.02 6029 1.01
Suhl 0.91 43.42 0.74 4872 0.89
GDR 296958 1.64
Average 0.09 48.12 0.81
∗ As a share of total district population in the previous year. Source: Information on internal migration based on
GDR Statistical Office (various years).
After the Berlin wall had been built in August 1961 approximately 750,000 people em-
igrated from the GDR until 1989 (Maretzke, 1991). The GDR statistical office provided
official data on cross-border migration in 1989 (column 5 and 6 of Table 5). The GDR
regime opened the borders to the FRG in November and, thus, gave the citizens the oppor-
tunity to emigrate. Already in 1989, within two months after the borders had been opened,
around 297,000 people left the GDR. The emigration as a percentage of total district pop-
ulation ranges from 0.74 in Neubrandenburg to 2.62 in Berlin and Dresden. Compared
to individuals in other districts, those from Dresden were more likely to leave the GDR.
However, this difference is not large.
Although I cannot completely rule out the possibility of self-selection, I address this issue
by using longitudinal data. Doing so, I can control for spatial mobility once the treatment
status of an individual has been identified based on his or her place of residence in June 1990.
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In principle, my findings could also be driven by some Dresden-specific factor. In section
6, I discuss and test the relevance of several alternative explanations of the findings. Since
the results remain robust, I am confident that my findings can be explained by differential
access to Western television.
5 Results
Table 6 presents the empirical findings concerning the determinants of the belief that effort
pays off during the late 1980s. I employ a probit approach since the dependent variable is
binary. As a first test of the robustness of the results to the inclusion of control variables,
I gradually add a set of variables capturing individual- and district-level characteristics. I
start with a regression of the respondents’ belief on the Dresden-dummy (i.e. the treatment
indicator), the second specification adds a set of individual-level controls and specification 3
further includes district-level characteristics.
As can be seen, living in a region with access to Western television increases the probability
to believe that effort pays off by almost 7 percentage points. A possible interpretation of
this finding is that Western television has offered GDR citizens a “window to the Western
world” with its values and attitudes through both political reporting and entertainment and
thereby has made them share a belief more common in the West.
Apart from Western television exposure, several socioeconomic characteristics have a sig-
nificant impact on individual beliefs. The probability of stressing the importance of effort
for success is, other things equal, lower for male, married, better educated,17 and poorer
individuals.
Does the effect of differential access to Western television on East Germans’ beliefs persist
after FRG broadcasts had been available in all parts of the GDR and individuals could also
learn about life in West Germany by their own experience? Table 7 displays the results of the
probit estimates on the determinants of beliefs between 1994 and 1999. In the first column,
the belief that success in life is mainly a matter of luck is regressed on the Dresden-dummy
and year fixed effects. The following specifications successively add a set of individual-level
17The fact that highly-educated individuals are less inclined to believe that effort pays off for themselves
might be a consequence of the communist system itself: income inequality was low in the GDR, implying
that a person with an university degree had no substantially higher income than a low educated worker.
Hence, the beliefs of highly-educated individuals may simply reflect their personal experience. Another
explanation might be that only citizens who agree with socialism were allowed to attend a university.
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Table 6: Effort pays off, GDR late 1980s
(1) (2) (3)
Dresden -0.0664*** -0.0645*** -0.0682***
(0.0229) (0.0212) (0.0201)
Age -0.0103 -0.0108
(0.0172) (0.0182)
Age2 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Female 0.1222*** 0.1284***
(0.0363) (0.0357)
Married -0.0503* -0.0428*
(0.0260) (0.0252)
Widowed or divorced -0.0475 -0.0371
(0.0415) (0.0432)
Children 0.0309 0.0306
(0.0360) (0.0360)
Net income 0.0088** 0.0111***
(0.0039) (0.0033)
Intermediate education -0.0735* -0.0709*
(0.0427) (0.0398)
High education -0.0423 -0.0322
(0.0394) (0.0403)
University degree -0.1534*** -0.1585***
(0.0450) (0.0456)
Population density -0.0001
(0.0001)
Industrial employment -0.0059
(0.0078)
Agricultural employment -0.0049
(0.0133)
Pseudo R2 0.0023 0.0190 0.0224
Observations 3381 2517 2517
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). Omitted
categories are male, never married, and finished 8th grade (or
less) in school. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at district level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
controls (specification 2), the regional unemployment rate (specification 3) and current state
of residence fixed effect (specification 4).
The findings suggest that the exposure to FRG television had a persistent effect on East
Germans’ beliefs: persons who had access to Western television were less likely to believe
that luck determines opportunities in life than individuals from parts of the GDR without
Western television. This is the case, although I control for the current economic factors (e.g.
net household income, occupation, and employment status) and regional unemployment. The
effect of television on individual beliefs is also sizeable as the marginal effect of the Dresden-
dummy ranges from 3.2 to 4.8 percentage points. Thus, the impact of FRG television is 1.5
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Table 7: Success in life is mainly a matter of luck, FRG 1994-1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dresden 0.0321** 0.0402*** 0.0447*** 0.0481***
(0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0144)
Age -0.0181*** -0.0178*** -0.0180***
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0064)
Age2 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Age3 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female 0.0405*** 0.0405*** 0.0400***
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0106)
Father’s education -0.0204** -0.0196** -0.0185**
(0.0087) (0.0089) (0.0078)
Married 0.0214 0.0204 0.0178
(0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0205)
Married but separated 0.0620 0.0607 0.0658
(0.0436) (0.0450) (0.0440)
Widowed or divorced 0.0366 0.0358 0.0343
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0358)
Not employed 0.0164 0.0172 0.0142
(0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0201)
Retired 0.0117 0.0116 0.0119
(0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0199)
Unemployed 0.0263* 0.0256* 0.0252*
(0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0139)
Self employed -0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0041
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0178)
Civil servant 0.0806** 0.0806** 0.0863**
(0.0359) (0.0366) (0.0346)
White collar -0.0212*** -0.0217*** -0.0233***
(0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0052)
University degree -0.0814*** -0.0809*** -0.0778***
(0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0153)
High education -0.1110*** -0.1103*** -0.1075***
(0.0227) (0.0234) (0.0238)
Intermediate education -0.0384** -0.0379** -0.0379**
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0170)
No. persons in household 0.0252*** 0.0245** 0.0217**
(0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0086)
No. children in household -0.0276*** -0.0269** -0.0247**
(0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0104)
Log. household income -0.0822*** -0.0810*** -0.0760***
(0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0156)
Currently living in West Germany -0.0142 0.0425 -0.0151**
(0.0295) (0.0479) (0.0076)
Unemployment experience 0.0082** 0.0083** 0.0078**
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0035)
Unemployment rate (state level) 0.0081 0.0128***
(0.0063) (0.0035)
Year FE YES YES YES YES
State FE NO NO NO YES
Pseudo R2 0.0094 0.0671 0.0678 0.0732
Observations 12168 10356 10356 10352
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). Omitted categories are male,
never married, being still in education, and less than 9 years of schooling. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered at Nuts2-level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
to 2 times the effect of being currently unemployed.
Several further explanatory variables affect individual beliefs. The respondent’s age has
a significant but non-linear impact. The probability of believing that luck is a major de-
terminant of success is higher for women, unemployed respondents, blue collar workers, and
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civil servants. Furthermore, the perceived relevance of luck decreases with both the respon-
dent’s own and his or her father’s level of education,18 the household income, the number
of children living in the same household and increases with the household size as well as
former unemployment experience. Finally, living in states with higher unemployment as
well as in West Germany increases the perceived importance of luck (at least if other state
characteristics are captured by current state of residence fixed effects).
The regression results presented in Table 8 provide further insights into how the impact
of differential access to West German television on East Germans’ belief that success in life
is mainly a matter of luck developed during the 1990s.19
Regression (1) is equal to specification 4 in Table 7 but reports the year fixed effects ex-
plicitly. Overall, East Germans were less likely to believe that success in life is a matter of
luck between 1994 and 1996 than they were in 1999. The interaction of the Dresden-dummy
and the year dummies (specification 2) reveals that individuals experienced a different devel-
opment in beliefs depending on their opportunity to watch Western television in the GDR.
While the probability to state that luck matters for success is decreasing over time for in-
dividuals from the former district of Dresden, those from other parts of the GDR became
more inclined to stress the relevance of luck during 1990s. This is also supported by a differ-
ential time trend (comp. specification 3 and 4). Thus, there has been a convergence in the
perceived importance of luck for success in life between individuals with and without access
to West German broadcasts during German separation.
Furthermore, I test the relevance of age or cohort effects for the convergence of beliefs.
The results of specification 5 do not point at any differential impact of age on the belief
that luck matters. The analysis of five different birth cohorts, however, reveals significant
differences between Dresden and the rest of the GDR. Compared to the oldest group of
individuals (i.e. those born before 1920), younger cohorts in Dresden are more inclined to
believe that success in life is mainly driven by luck. For individuals from other parts of the
GDR no such significant difference between the cohort groups exists.
18The results do not change if instead of the father’s the mother’s level of education is included.
19The findings shown in Table 8 are based on a linear probability model since marginal effects of interaction
terms as calculated in nonlinear models (such as Probit) are likely to be inconsistent (Ai and Norton,
2003). By estimating a linear probability model, it is possible to interpret the significance and direction
of the interaction effect.
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Table 8: Success in life is mainly a matter of luck, FRG 1994-1999 - Regres-
sions with interaction effects
Convergence or Divergence in beliefs Age vs. Cohort effects West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dresden 0.0501*** 0.0202 0.0502*** 0.1108*** 0.0316 -0.0203 0.0470***
(0.0143) (0.0178) (0.0143) (0.0205) (0.0266) (0.0230) (0.0134)
1994 -0.0466*** -0.0488***
(0.0136) (0.0150)
1995 -0.0415*** -0.0418***
(0.0137) (0.0128)
1996 -0.0768*** -0.0796***
(0.0119) (0.0117)
1994 x Dresden 0.0380***
(0.0130)
1995 x Dresden 0.0352***
(0.0097)
1996 x Dresden 0.0430**
(0.0163)
Time trend 0.0112*** 0.0122***
(0.0026) (0.0026)
Time trend x Dresden -0.0088***
(0.0022)
Age 0.0010
(0.0009)
Age x Dresden 0.0005
(0.0005)
Born 1920 - 1945 0.0185
(0.0325)
Born 1946 - 1960 0.0008
(0.0385)
Born 1961 - 1975 -0.0160
(0.0541)
Born 1976 - 1990 0.0012
(0.0642)
Born 1920 - 1945 x Dresden 0.0888***
(0.0386)
Born 1946 - 1960 x Dresden 0.0722**
(0.0325)
Born 1961 - 1975 x Dresden 0.0536***
(0.0336)
Born 1976 - 1990 x Dresden 0.0847***
(0.0433)
West Germany -0.0188**
(0.0092)
West Germany x Dresden 0.0536
(0.0946)
Year FE YES YES YES
Observations 10356 10356 10356 10356 10356 10356 10356
R2 0.0716 0.0718 0.0690 0.0692 0.0708 0.0716 0.0717
Notes: Linear probability model estimated based on specification (4) in Table 7. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at Nuts2-level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
20
Finally, recent life experience might not have a similar impact on individuals with dif-
ferential access to Western television already before reunification. Specification 7 indeed
indicates that moving to West Germany has lowered the probability to believe that luck
matters for individuals who are originally from regions with access to Western television but
has no significant impact on those from Dresden.
Table 9: Success in life is mainly a matter of luck - Time trend interacted
with Dresden (balanced panel)
(1) (2) (3)
Dresden 0.0824*** 0.0862*** 0.0899***
(0.0262) (0.0204) (0.0224)
Time trend 0.0207*** 0.0144*** 0.0145***
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0029)
Time trend x Dresden -0.0059* -0.0059** -0.0066***
(0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0023)
State FE NO NO YES
Observations 9119 9119 9119
R2 0.0628 0.0638 0.0685
Notes: Based on specifications 2 to 4 Table 7 but restricted to individu-
als who answered the question on the relevance of luck for success in all
years (balanced panel). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
Nuts2-level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 9 further presents how changes in the cohort composition versus actual changes in
respondents’ beliefs contribute to the convergence between the two groups. The analysis is
based on a balanced panel data set including only individuals who answered all questions
between 1994 and 1999. By comparing the differential time trend for this sample with
the unbalanced sample used for specification 4 in Table 8, I can calculate the share of the
convergence that is driven by a change in cohort composition (i.e. a dropping out of older
cohorts) versus the part that is driven by actual changes in beliefs over time. The coefficient
of the interaction variable “Time trend x Dresden” is approximately 25 percent smaller for
the balanced panel indicating that around 75 percent of the convergence is driven by actual
changes in beliefs.
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6 Robustness and some further results
The empirical findings suggest that East Germans with access to Western television were
more inclined to share beliefs more common in the West both before reunification and several
years afterwards. Dresden seems to be on average comparable to other GDR-districts (see
Table 3 and 4). Still, a major concern might be that factors others than television reception
cause the differences in beliefs. In the following, I test the robustness of the results by
varying the group of districts Dresden is compared to (control group) and include variables
which account for alternative explanations.
6.1 Varying the control group
In Table 10 the robustness of the results is tested using different groups of districts as a
comparison group for Dresden. First, I exclude observations from East Berlin from the
sample. The district of Berlin is not fully comparable to other districts due to its position
as the capital of the GDR and the fact that the former city of Berlin had been separated by
the allied forces. Second, the analysis will be restricted to Saxon districts (Dresden, Leipzig
and Karl-Marx-Stadt). These districts share a common history as parts of the Kingdom of
Saxony and, therefore, most likely also a common culture and values. Moreover, they are
also highly comparable with respect to other characteristics (see Table 4). Furthermore, the
observable differences could also be explained by the geographical location of the Dresden-
district in the Eastern part of the GDR. It could also be the case that after the fall of the
Berlin wall higher costs of travelling to West Germany due to the larger distance deters
the population in the Eastern part from learning about the West by own experience. If
that explains the different beliefs, then the same should apply to all regions located in the
East of the GDR. Thus, I restrict the analysis to these regions. For the analysis based
on the GSOEP also data for the outermost Northeast of the GDR which had only partial
access to these broadcasts is available. Hence, the treatment group is extended to both
regions without Western television reception (i.e., Dresden and the regional planning unit
Greifswald-Stralsund).
The results indicate that the treatment effect remains widely unchanged if East Berlin is
excluded or only Saxon districts are analyzed.
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Table 10: Different group of districts
Effort pays off Success in life is mainly a matter of luck
GDR, late 1980s FRG 1994-99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline
Dresden -0.0664*** -0.0645*** 0.0321** 0.0402*** 0.0447*** 0.0481***
(0.0229) (0.0212) (0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0144)
Pseudo R2 0.0023 0.0190 0.0094 0.0671 0.0678 0.0732
Observations 3382 2517 12168 10356 10356 10352
Control group
GDR without -0.0783*** -0.0759*** 0.0256* 0.0390*** 0.0434*** 0.0503***
Berlin (0.0241) (0.0215) (0.0147) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0145)
Pseudo R2 0.0035 0.0185 0.0095 0.0684 0.0687 0.0742
Observations 2990 2258 11279 9619 9619 9615
Saxony -0.0859*** -0.0814*** 0.0298 0.0483*** 0.0480*** 0.0477***
(0.0023) (0.0119) (0.0203) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0146)
Pseudo R2 0.0056 0.0232 0.0088 0.0796 0.0845 0.0878
Observations 1596 1218 4115 3532 3532 3522
Eastern part 0.0225 0.0435*** 0.0448*** 0.0277***
of the GDR – – (0.0177) (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0072)
Pseudo R2 0.0095 0.0694 0.0696 0.0778
Observations 4068 3424 3424 3414
Treatment group
Dresden & -0.0153 0.0004 0.0005 0.0423***
Greifswald – – (0.0293) (0.0314) (0.0325) (0.0160)
Pseudo R2 0.0095 0.0663 0.0663 0.0729
Observations 10963 9317 9317 9317
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). The results shown in column 1 and 2
are based on the respective specifications in Table 6, while columns 3 to 6 are based on Table
7. For further information on included controls see Table 6 and 7. Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered at Nuts2-level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
If the control is restricted to regions in the East of the GDR, the treatment effect becomes
smaller. Furthermore, the treatment effect loses its significance if Greifswald is included as
the second part of the GDR with only partial access to Western television. Although this
may be an indication that the results are driven by (unobservable) Dresden-specific charac-
teristics, the partial insignificance does not necessarily imply that Western television has no
effect. The area in the Northeast without West German television reception did not coincide
perfectly with “Greifswald-Stralsund” (as it was the case with the district of Dresden in
the Southeast).20 Consequently, the smaller and less significant treatment effect may reflect
20This is also indicated by a survey conducted by the central institute for youth research in 1981. While
68.8 percent of the respondents living in the district of Dresden stated that they did not watch Western
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downward biased estimates as individuals might be assigned to the treatment group who
actually had access to Western television. Furthermore, Dresden and Greifswald-Stralsund
differ with respect to other characteristics (e.g. Greifswald-Stralsund is more rural). This
heterogeneity might have contributed to the loss of significance since the treatment effect
gets highly significant if state fixed effects controlling for such heterogeneity are included.
6.2 Alternative explanations for structural differences between
Dresden and other parts of the GDR
Now, I extend the baseline analysis by including additional district level characteristics
which account for alternative explanations for the differences in beliefs. The GDR was a
planned economy with a considerable amount of regional specialization on certain sectors and
industries which affected the composition of the population (e.g. industrial vs. agricultural
workers). To capture these differences several variables are added to the baseline regressions
of the belief that effort pays off during the late 1980s (see Table 11). The relevance of
industrial production in each district (i.e. district’s share of gross industrial production of
the GDR) is included in column (1). Further controls are the share of working age population
(as a percentage of total district population) in column (2) and the level of education of the
district’s working population (share of workers with an university degree) in column (3).
While the share of industrial production has no significant effect on the respondents’ beliefs,
a higher share of population in their working age and better educated workers increase the
probability to believe that effort pays off.
Furthermore, the geographical location of a district may be related to its inhabitants’
attitudes. Hence, I include both a variable indicating whether a district has a common border
with the FRG and the distance between the district capital and Berlin (in kilometers). The
results, however, do not indicate a significant relationship.
Finally, Dresden was famous for its arts and culture. Thus, the population had perhaps
been more interested in culture, arts, and literature. More generally, if (traditionally ed-
ucated) middle-class intellectuals entertain different beliefs than the rest of the population
this could also explain the main findings of this paper. Therefore, I include both dummy-
variables indicating whether the respondent had lately been to a theater, cinema, or museum
television at all, the share in the districts Rostock and Neubrandenburg was only 27 percent.
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(specifications 6 to 8) and the number of theater visitors in each district (weighted by the
total district population). The individual interest in arts and culture affects beliefs at least
partly: Individuals who visited cinema and museums are more likely to belief that effort pays
off. Moreover, individuals in districts where a higher share of the population visits theaters
are less inclined to believe that effort pays off.
An overall important finding is that the inclusion of these further control variables does
not change the results in substance with the treatment indicator remaining robust and
significant.
The identification of the Western television effect during the 1990s does not only depend
on the absence of structural differences before reunification but also on the assumption that
both regions were not hit by (systematically) different shocks afterwards. Otherwise, the
observable differences between individuals from Dresden and those from other parts of the
GDR could also be a consequence of differences in the economic or social conditions.
To address these concerns, I add several regional characteristics to my baseline specification
using data from the GSOEP (see specification 4 in Table 7). Table 12 displays the results.
Due to data constraints, the specifications 2 to 6 are only based on observations for the years
1996 and 1999. To enhance the comparability of the results and to distinguish between the
impact of different samples and of additional controls, column 1 shows the results of the
baseline regression based on observations from 1996 and 1999.
After reunification, wide parts of East Germany faced considerable problems as most parts
of the GDR economy were not capable of competing with the West. Since unemployment in-
creased during the 1990s, some East German regions experienced a considerable population
loss and demographic problems. To capture related economic and demographic differences,
I add each regional planning unit’s population density (specification 2), share of inhabitants
older than 65 (specification 3), unemployment rate (specification 4), average monthly labor
income of industrial workers (specification 5), and GDP per capita (specification 6). The
results indicate that only the regional unemployment rate has a significant effect on the re-
spondents likelihood to believe that success is mainly a consequence of luck. More important,
the coefficients of the Dresden-dummy remain highly significant and robust.
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Table 11: Effort pays off (GDR, late 1980s) - Additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dresden -0.0662*** -0.1035*** -0.0630*** -0.0742*** -0.0426*** -0.0806*** -0.0609*** -0.0836***
(0.0171) (0.0181) (0.0176) (0.0066) (0.0134) (0.0294) (0.0210) (0.0297)
Industrial Production 0.0006
(0.0059)
Working age population -0.0213***
(0.0066)
High educated workers -0.0062***
(0.0011)
Border district -0.0103
(0.0236)
Distance to Berlin 0.0001
(0.0003)
Theater visitors (/1000) -0.1009***
(0.0210)
Theater 0.0113
(0.0414)
Cinema -0.0197**
(0.0083)
Museum 0.0681**
(0.0330)
Pseudo R2 0.0190 0.0207 0.0213 0.0191 0.0231 0.0230 0.0195 0.0254
Observations 2517.0000 2517.0000 2517.0000 2517.0000 2517.0000 826.0000 2509.0000 826.0000
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). Based on the specification presented in the second column of Table 6. For
further information on included controls see Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at district level. ***/**/*
denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table 12: Luck matters for success (FRG 1994-99) - Additional control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dresden 0.0358*** 0.0393*** 0.0367*** 0.0312*** 0.0357*** 0.0348*** 0.0678*** 0.0490***
(0.0118) (0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0161) (0.0119)
Population density 0.0001
(0.0001)
Inhabitants older than 65 0.0010
(0.0063)
Unemployment rate (regional planning unit) 0.0111***
(0.0031)
Average industrial wage 0.0000
(0.0000)
GDP per capita -0.0027
(0.0027)
Mother: Catholic 0.0710**
(0.0303)
Mother: Protestant 0.0510***
(0.0198)
Mother: Other 0.0870**
(0.0402)
Respondent (1990): Catholic -0.0065
(0.0274)
Respondent (1990): Protestant 0.0324*
(0.0178)
Respondent (1990): Other -0.0702*
(0.0360)
Pseudo R2 0.0787 0.0788 0.0787 0.0796 0.0787 0.0787 0.0631 0.0806
Observations 5394 5394 5394 5394 5394 5394 2274 9212
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). Based on the specification presented in the second column of Table 7. For further information
on included controls see Table 7. Omitted category in the specifications (8) and (9) is no religion. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at
district level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Another concern is related to cultural or religious differences between the two groups.
Thus, I include the respondent’s own religious denomination in 1990 and his or her mother’s
religion to proxy cultural effects.21 The findings suggest a significant impact of religion
on the belief regarding the role of luck for success: Individuals with a religious mother
(independent of her denomination) are more inclined to believe that luck matters. The
results on the respondent’s own religion in 1990 show that protestants (and those belonging
to other religious communities) tend to be more (less) likely to stress the relevance of luck
than those without on religious denomination. The Dresden-dummy again remains robust.
6.3 Some additional insights into the role of Western television
The main objective of East German television was the indoctrination of the audience to
alter their attitudes toward the GDR and socialism. Kern and Hainmueller (2009) analyze
- based on GDR survey data - how access to West German television has affected attitudes
toward the GDR in the late 1980s. They find that Western television contributed to a more
positive assessment of different aspects of life in the GDR. Their basic explanation for this
is that Western television made life in the GDR more bearable, which increased general
satisfaction and made East Germans less critical toward the GDR regime and realities of
socialism. This is in line with my argument that West German television affected East
Germans’ beliefs mainly by presenting different world views and values in its entertainment
programs. Insofar, Kern and Hainmu¨ller’s and my work shed a light on different aspects of
entertainment provided by television.
Though the effect of Western television on economic beliefs persisted during the 1990s,
this must not be the case for the attitudes toward the GDR. If the main contribution of
Western television was the entertainment of East Germans, the effect of different access to
these broadcasts should not persist once everyone obtains the opportunity to watch and
the situation in the GDR actually changes. Thus, I complement the analysis of Kern and
Hainmueller (2009) by testing empirically whether the attitudes toward the GDR are still
different between individuals from Dresden and other parts of the GDR after the reunification
process started.
The empirical results presented in Table 13 confirm the earlier finding that before reunifi-
cation, individuals without access to Western television were more skeptical toward several
21Using the father’s instead of the mother’s religion does not change the results.
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aspects of life in the GDR. Those living in the district of Dresden are significantly less con-
tent with the quality of reporting by state-controlled GDR media, less satisfied with life
in the GDR in general, and significantly less optimistic about the future development of
the economy and democracy in socialist states. Furthermore, the findings indicate a signif-
icantly positive relationship between access to Western television and the agreement with
the Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Table 13: Attitudes toward the GDR and socialism, GDR, late 1980s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDR media Life GDR Socialist Socialist Marx-Lenin
economies democracy
Dresden -0.1571*** -0.0530*** -0.0852*** -0.0850** -0.0708***
(0.0193) (0.0066) (0.0204) (0.0246) (0.0118)
Age -0.0023 -0.0055 -0.0470*** -0.0173 0.0432***
(0.0115) (0.0083) (0.0064) (0.0144) (0.0119)
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007*** 0.0003 -0.0005**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Female 0.1538*** 0.0379*** 0.0749*** 0.0663** 0.1349***
(0.0314) (0.0136) (0.0194) (0.0225) (0.0327)
Married -0.0649*** -0.0142 -0.0035 -0.0159 0.0157
(0.0173) (0.0297) (0.0186) (0.0209) (0.0276)
Widowed or divorced 0.0155 -0.0246 -0.0239 0.0162 0.0274*
(0.0273) (0.0396) (0.0581) (0.0699) (0.0131)
Children 0.0422 0.0216 0.0510 0.0634** -0.0325
(0.0321) (0.0213) (0.0410) (0.0265) (0.0344)
University degree -0.1933*** 0.0122 -0.0484* -0.0943 -0.0441*
(0.0318) (0.0363) (0.0247) (0.0507) (0.0222)
Net income 0.0128 -0.0003 0.0039 0.0078 0.0065
(0.0104) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0072)
Intermediate education -0.0836*** 0.0565*** -0.0398 -0.0566 0.0791
(0.0323) (0.0139) (0.0313) (0.0381) (0.0438)
High education -0.0776 0.0706 -0.0851*** -0.0407 0.2301***
(0.0515) (0.0442) (0.0205) (0.0413) (0.0433)
Population density -0.0002** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Industrial employment -0.0139* -0.0063** -0.0116 -0.0070 -0.0174***
(0.0073) (0.0028) (0.0083) (0.0100) (0.0045)
Agricultural employment -0.0222 -0.0053 -0.0143 -0.0103 -0.0270**
(0.0134) (0.0051) (0.0159) (0.0192) (0.0077)
Pseudo R2 0.0437 0.0488 0.0279
Observations 2571 2603 2607 2603 2598
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). The dependent variables equal one for respondents who
(1) feel well informed by GDR media (GDR media), (2) like living in the GDR (Life GDR), are confident in the
development of (3) the economy of socialist countries (Socialist economies) and (4) the socialist democracy in the
GDR (Socialist democracy), and (5) agree with the Marxist-Leninist world view (Marx-Lenin). Omitted categories
are male, never married, and finished 8th grade (or less) in school. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
at district level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table 14 presents the findings of the analysis using data from the GSOEP for the 1990s
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Table 14: Attitudes toward the GDR and happiness, FRG, 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social security Democracy Life standard Happiness Expected happiness
GDR (1990) GDR (1990) GDR (1991-94) (1990-99) in 5 yrs. (1990-99)
Dresden 0.0218 -0.0047 0.0496** -0.0007 0.0319**
(0.0248) (0.0353) (0.0213) (0.0132) (0.0144)
Age -0.0089 -0.0155 -0.0151** -0.0321*** -0.0001
(0.0163) (0.0185) (0.0065) (0.0080) (0.0054)
Age2 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002* 0.0005** -0.0003*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Age3 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female 0.0081 -0.0140 -0.0049 -0.0048 0.0011
(0.0137) (0.0109) (0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0071)
Father’s education -0.0075 -0.0224 -0.0218*** 0.0022 0.0124*
(0.0189) (0.0240) (0.0059) (0.0052) (0.0064)
Married 0.0355 0.0036 -0.0326** 0.0481*** 0.0074
(0.0355) (0.0385) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0212)
Married but separated 0.0626 -0.0093 -0.1077* -0.0946*** 0.0102
(0.1226) (0.0818) (0.0559) (0.0286) (0.0426)
Widowed or divorced -0.0228 -0.0220 -0.0287 0.0267 0.0323*
(0.0532) (0.0534) (0.0240) (0.0193) (0.0168)
Not employed -0.0697 0.0514 -0.0533* -0.0335 0.0313
(0.0451) (0.0389) (0.0326) (0.0405) (0.0268)
Retired 0.0741** 0.1123*** -0.0085 0.0111 0.0273
(0.0376) (0.0385) (0.0161) (0.0224) (0.0171)
Unemployed -0.0146* -0.1622*** -0.0674***
(0.0082) (0.0092) (0.0132)
Self employed 0.0624 0.0149 0.0119 0.0062 0.0897***
(0.0574) (0.0523) (0.0191) (0.0183) (0.0221)
Civil servant 0.0117 0.1035** 0.1451*
(0.0480) (0.0478) (0.0740)
White collar -0.0050 0.0248 -0.0006 0.0460*** 0.0505**
(0.0163) (0.0270) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0247)
University degree -0.0606** 0.0120 -0.0113 0.0093 0.0027
(0.0263) (0.0366) (0.0114) (0.0171) (0.0108)
High education -0.0759 0.0466 -0.0716*** 0.0087 0.0122
(0.0537) (0.0626) (0.0194) (0.0425) (0.0286)
Intermediate education -0.0188 0.0514 -0.0352** 0.0153 0.0107
(0.0449) (0.0429) (0.0177) (0.0276) (0.0218)
No. persons in household -0.0083 -0.0099 0.0123* -0.0475*** -0.0157
(0.0190) (0.0161) (0.0069) (0.0120) (0.0113)
No. children in household 0.0155 0.0141 -0.0065 0.0416*** 0.0144**
(0.0254) (0.0182) (0.0085) (0.0073) (0.0064)
Log. household income 0.1613*** 0.1060***
(0.0151) (0.0151)
Low household income 0.0342 0.0289 -0.0077
(0.0461) (0.0391) (0.0150)
Intermed. household income 0.0203 0.0270 -0.0105
(0.0268) (0.0386) (0.0123)
Currently living in West Germany 0.1867*** 0.1028* 0.1728***
(0.0510) (0.0556) (0.0556)
Unemployment experience 0.0125 -0.0395* -0.0084* -0.0296*** -0.0229***
(0.0102) (0.0234) (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0042)
Unemployment rate (state level) 0.0256* 0.0149 0.0215*** 0.0023 0.0043
(0.0141) (0.0189) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054)
Year FE NO NO YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.0145 0.0118 0.0404 0.0517 0.0682
Observations 2994 2991 11747 20011 19927
Notes: Probit regressions (marginal effects are shown). The dependent variables equals one for respondents who are satisfied with (1) the social
security (Social security GDR, or (2) the democracy in the GDR (Democracy GDR), the (3) general standard of living in the GDR (Life standard),
and who stated to be (4) satisfied with life in general (Happiness) or (5) expect to be satisfied in five years (Expected happiness). Omitted categories
are male, never married, being still in education, being born before 1931, less than 9 years of schooling, and an available household income above
the 75th percentile in 1992. The unemployment rate is measured as the average unemployment rate in the state of residence between 1991 and
1995 in the analysis of social security and democracy in the GDR. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of the regional
planning units or in case of (expected) happiness at Nuts2-level. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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to test the persistence of differential attitudes after the reunification. In summer 1990, soon
after the inner-German border was opened, no significant differences in the assessment of
the social security and the democracy in the GDR are observable.
However, individuals from the Dresden-district are relatively more satisfied with the stan-
dard of living in East Germany after reunification. While individuals who had lived in the
district of Dresden before reunification and those from other parts of the GDR do not differ
significantly with respect to their general happiness during the 1990s, those from Dresden
are more optimistic toward their future life happiness.
7 Conclusion
This paper exploits a natural experiment on West German television reception in the former
GDR to analyze its impact on East Germans’ beliefs before and up to one decade after
reunification. I show that the availability of Western television has made East Germans more
inclined to believe that effort rather than luck determines success in life. Moreover, Western
television also affected attitudes toward the GDR and socialism. While the exposure to West
German media is reflected in personal beliefs up to ten years after reunification, differences
in attitudes diminished soon after the fall of the Berlin wall.
I argue that the regime-stabilizing effect of Western television and its impact on East
Germans’ beliefs reflect two different aspects of entertainment programs (e.g. movies or
soap operas). In the short run, these programs made life in real-existing socialism more
bearable. Beyond entertainment, Western soap operas and movies also provided additional
signals about the relationship between effort (as opposed to predetermined factors such as
luck) and success and by this affected the corresponding beliefs of East Germans. Those
elementary beliefs remain rather stable once they are formed in a critical age (e.g. during
early adulthood; see Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009), which can explain the persistence of
the effect of differential access to Western television during the 1990s.
It might be true that the main findings of this paper are driven by some Dresden-specific
factor. Given the robustness of the result to various additional tests, I am, however, confident
that West German television has indeed affected the beliefs and attitudes of East Germans.
Hence, state-controlled media seem to have been a part of socialization that has left its
marks on East Germans minds.
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This analysis is based on exposure to Western television in the GDR and, thus, on a
specific situation. Still, it indicates that the role of information provided by mass media
should not be overlooked for belief formation. Since beliefs on the drivers of success are also
correlated with voters’ preferences for redistribution, television may affect policy outcomes
even if that may not be intended but may just be a byproduct of providing entertainment.
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Appendix
Table 15: Summary Statistics - GDR 1988/89
All observations Treatment group Control group
Dresden GDR excl. Berlin Leipzig & Karl-Marx-Stadt
Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Obs. Mean Std.Dev.
Baseline regression
Effort pays off 3381 0.58 0.49 0 1 736 0.53 0.50 2645 0.60 0.49 2254 0.61 0.49 860 0.62 0.49
Age 3497 23.09 6.38 15 50 770 23.36 6.36 2727 23.02 6.38 2314 22.97 6.19 891 24.13 6.74
Female 3526 0.48 0.50 0 1 777 0.51 0.50 2749 0.47 0.50 2332 0.48 0.50 900 0.60 0.49
Never married 3525 0.68 0.47 0 1 777 0.65 0.48 2748 0.69 0.46 2331 0.69 0.45 900 0.56 0.50
Married 3525 0.28 0.45 0 1 777 0.32 0.47 2748 0.27 0.45 2331 0.27 0.45 900 0.40 0.49
Divorced/Widowed 3525 0.04 0.19 0 1 777 0.04 0.18 2748 0.04 0.20 2331 0.04 0.19 900 0.04 0.20
Children 3507 0.33 0.47 0 1 773 0.38 0.49 2734 0.31 0.46 2318 0.31 0.46 891 0.40 0.49
Net income 2742 3.91 1.87 1 9 594 4.02 1.87 2148 3.88 1.86 1859 3.80 1.83 730 3.86 1.86
Low education 3531 0.09 0.29 0 1 778 0.09 0.28 2753 0.10 0.29 2336 0.09 0.29 903 0.06 0.25
Intermed. education 3531 0.80 0.40 0 1 778 0.81 0.40 2753 0.80 0.40 2336 0.81 0.39 903 0.81 0.40
High education 3531 0.10 0.31 0 1 778 0.11 0.31 2753 0.10 0.30 2336 0.10 0.30 903 0.13 0.34
University 3479 0.06 0.23 0 1 769 0.08 0.27 2710 0.05 0.22 2297 0.05 0.22 893 0.07 0.25
Population density 3563 555.81 958.78 68 3174 784 254 0 2779 640.95 1070.39 2360 191.23 85.04 910 291.65 15.65
Industrial employment 3563 38.50 7.73 24.3 48.1 784 42.8 0 2779 37.28 8.36 2360 39.41 7.24 910 45.60 3.78
Agricultural employment 3563 9.37 5.05 1 22.2 784 8.1 0 2779 9.73 5.66 2360 11.28 4.67 910 6.70 1.06
Addtional variables
GDR media 3455 0.36 0.48 0 1 758 0.27 0.44 2697 0.39 0.49 877 0.42 0.49
Life GDR 3520 0.91 0.28 0 1 775 0.85 0.35 2745 0.93 0.26 2327 0.93 0.26 897 0.92 0.27
Socialist economies 3527 0.45 0.50 0 1 773 0.38 0.49 2754 0.47 0.50 2337 0.50 0.50 899 0.49 0.50
Socialist democracy 3524 0.52 0.50 0 1 772 0.46 0.50 2752 0.53 0.50 2333 0.55 0.50 898 0.58 0.50
Marx-Lenin 3516 0.65 0.48 0 1 775 0.60 0.49 2741 0.66 0.48 2323 0.66 0.47 894 0.69 0.46
Industrial production 3563 8.38 2.82 2.5 12.5 784 10.7 0 2779 7.72 2.87 2360 8.12 2.95 910 11.07 2.16
Working age population 3563 64.39 1.41 62.9 67.5 784 62.9 0 2779 64.82 1.32 2360 64.34 0.73 910 63.53 0.51
High educated workers 3563 20.62 4.69 17 33 784 20.6 0 2779 20.63 5.31 2360 18.43 1.11 910 18.13 1.70
Border district 3563 0.69 0.46 0 1 784 0 0 2779 0.88 0.33 2360 0.86 0.35 2360 0.70 0.46
Distance to Berlin 3563 156.78 67.37 0 283.45 784 165.41 0 2779 154.34 76.10 2360 181.74 42.88 910 178.62 19.03
Theater visitors 3563 0.002 0.0004 0.0008 0.003 784 0.0019 0 2779 0.0017 0.00045 2360 0.0015 0.0002 910 0.0014 0.00002
Theater 1166 0.22 0.42 0 1 257 0.25 0.43 909 0.22 0.41 771 0.18 0.39 302 0.15 0.36
Cinema 3522 0.43 0.50 0 1 777 0.50 0.50 2745 0.41 0.49 2329 0.38 0.49 898 0.37 0.48
Museum 1165 0.42 0.49 0 1 257 0.45 0.50 908 0.41 0.49 771 0.40 0.49 304 0.41 0.49
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Table 16: Summary statistics - SOEP data
All observations Treatment group Control group
Dresden excl. Greifswald- excl. Berlin &
Stralsund Greifswald-Stralsund Saxony East
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Baseline regression
Luck 13910 0.22 0.41 0 1 1385 0.25 0.43 11819 0.22 0.41 10928 0.22 0.42 2731 0.22 0.42 3018 0.22 0.42
Age 36715 43.54 16.4 17 98 3734 42.39 16.16 31786 43.65 16.42 29383 43.74 16.52 7284 45.13 16.62 8159 44.64 16.80
Female 36715 0.52 0.50 0 1 3734 0.53 0.50 31786 0.52 0.50 29383 0.52 0.50 7284 0.53 0.50 8159 0.52 0.50
Father’s education 31059 2.31 0.64 0 4 3252 2.35 0.65 26892 2.30 0.63 24857 2.28 0.61 6150 2.30 0.63 6726 2.25 0.59
Never married 36460 0.21 0.41 0 1 3718 0.20 0.40 31560 0.21 0.41 29204 0.20 0.40 7252 0.18 0.39 8115 0.20 0.40
Married 36301 0.66 0.47 0 1 3704 0.69 0.46 31422 0.66 0.47 29082 0.67 0.47 7222 0.68 0.47 8090 0.67 0.47
Married but separated 36301 0.01 0.10 0 1 3704 0.01 0.09 31422 0.01 0.10 29082 0.01 0.10 7222 0.01 0.10 8090 0.01 0.10
Widowed or divorced 36301 0.12 0.32 0 1 3704 0.11 0.31 31422 0.12 0.32 29082 0.12 0.32 7222 0.12 0.33 8090 0.13 0.33
Not employed 36173 0.03 0.17 0 1 3691 0.03 0.17 31318 0.03 0.17 28964 0.03 0.17 7200 0.03 0.17 8064 0.03 0.18
Pensioner 36173 0.19 0.40 0 1 3691 0.17 0.38 31318 0.20 0.40 28964 0.20 0.40 7200 0.21 0.41 8064 0.22 0.41
In education 36173 0.05 0.21 0 1 3691 0.05 0.21 31318 0.05 0.21 28964 0.04 0.20 7200 0.04 0.20 8064 0.04 0.20
Unemployed 36173 0.10 0.30 0 1 3691 0.09 0.29 31318 0.10 0.31 28964 0.11 0.31 7200 0.11 0.31 8064 0.12 0.32
Self-employed 36173 0.04 0.20 0 1 3691 0.05 0.22 31318 0.04 0.20 28964 0.04 0.19 7200 0.04 0.18 8064 0.04 0.20
Civil servant 36173 0.01 0.11 0 1 3691 0.007 0.08 31318 0.01 0.11 28964 0.01 0.10 7200 0.009 0.09 8064 0.01 0.11
White collar 36269 0.28 0.45 0 1 3697 0.29 0.45 31401 0.27 0.45 29041 0.27 0.44 7219 0.27 0.44 8083 0.25 0.43
Blue collar 36269 0.24 0.43 0 1 3697 0.24 0.43 31401 0.24 0.43 29041 .25 0.43 7219 0.26 0.44 8083 0.23 0.42
University degree 36290 0.23 0.42 0 1 3710 0.25 0.43 31402 0.23 0.42 29032 0.22 0.41 7196 0.21 0.41 8073 0.22 0.41
High education 35912 0.13 0.34 0 1 3674 0.15 0.35 31070 0.13 0.34 28759 0.12 0.32 7157 0.13 0.34 7981 0.12 0.33
Intermed. education 35597 0.79 0.41 0 1 3640 0 .78 0.42 30795 0.79 0.41 28498 0.80 0.40 7121 0.78 0.41 24836 0.80 0.40
Low education 35642 0.08 0.27 0 1 3644 0.08 0.27 30834 0.08 0.27 28535 0.08 0.27 7124 0.09 0.28 7938 0.10 0.31
No. persons in household 36715 3.01 1.19 1 8 3734 3.22 1.14 31786 2.99 1.20 29383 3.01 1.20 7284 2.80 1.06 8159 2.91 1.14
No. children in household 66357 0.83 0.99 0 6 6970 1.06 1.01 57477 0.82 0.99 52866 0.81 1.00 12898 0.69 0.92
Available household in-
come
28283 10.14 0.50 3.47 12.23 2859 10.19 0.49 24504 10.14 0.50 22638 10.13 0.50 5624 10.09 0.47 6248 10.07 0.47
West Germany 36715 0.03 0.17 0 1 3734 0.04 0.19 31786 0.03 0.16 29383 0.03 0.16 7284 0.04 0.20 8159 0.03 0.18
Unemployment experience 35404 0.36 0.93 0 19 3626 0.28 0.73 30665 0.36 0.95 28346 0.36 0.96 7049 0.36 0.92 7812 0.39 0.94
Unemployment rate (state) 32332 15.82 3.25 3.7 21.7 3286 14.91 3.21 28001 15.89 3.24 25885 16.02 3.25 6407 14.99 3.27 7169 15.32 3.10
Additional variables
Social security GDR 4335 0.43 0.50 0 1 446 0.42 0.49 3740 0.43 0.50 3457 0.44 0.50 862 0.43 0.50 978 0.45 0.50
Democracy GDR 4334 0.42 0.49 0 1 447 0.40 0.49 3738 0.43 0.50 3455 0.44 0.50 862 0.47 0.50 978 0.46 0.50
Life GDR 15028 0.23 0.42 0 1 1569 0.25 0.44 12984 0.23 0.42 12011 0.23 0.43 2934 0.21 0.41 3353 0.23 0.42
Happiness 36095 0.53 0.50 0 1 3690 0.53 0.50 31246 0.53 0.50 28894 0.53 0.50 7170 0.53 0.50 8031 0.51 0.50
Expected happiness in 5
yrs.
35945 0.61 0.49 0 1 3681 0.65 0.48 31123 0.61 0.49 28785 0.61 0.49 7132 0.63 0.48 7990 0.60 0.49
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Table 16: Summary statistics - SOEP data
All observations Treatment group Control group
Dresden excl. Greifswald- excl. Berlin &
Stralsund Greifswald-Stralsund Saxony East
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev. Obs Mean Std.Dev.
Population density 13467 405.37 895.88 52 3891 1341 229.95 86.66 11692 434.92 953.07
Inhabitants older than 65 13467 15.74 1.59 12.4 19.1 1341 16.68 0.62 11692 15.69 1.63
Unemployment rate (re-
gional planning unit)
13467 18.05 2.88 6 23.4 1341 17.31 3.16 11692 18.08 2.83
Average industrial wage 13467 2007.29 340.25 1035 3835 1341 17.31 3.16 11692 2016.23 348.74
GDR per capita 13467 16.64 3.08 13.2 41.9 1341 16.59 3.62 11692 16.70 3.01
Mother: Catholic 7067 0.07 0.25 0 1 719 0.10 0.30 6043 0.07 0.25
Mother: Protestant 7067 0.32 0.47 0 1 719 0.32 0.47 6043 0.34 0.47
Mother: Other 7067 0.04 0.19 0 1 719 0.04 0.18 6043 0.04 0.19
Mother: Not religious 7067 0.57 0.50 0 1 719 0.55 0.50 6043 0.56 0.50
Respondent(1990):
Catholic
33534 0.06 0.23 0 1 3311 0.08 0.27 29117 0.05 0.23
Respondent(1990): Protes-
tant
33534 0.28 0.45 0 1 3311 0.26 0.44 29117 0.29 0.45
Respondent(1990): Other 33534 .01 0.09 0 1 3311 0.01 0.12 29117 0.01 0.08
Respondent(1990): Not re-
ligious
33534 0.66 0.48 0 1 3311 0.64 0.48 33534 0.66 0.48
Low household income 1165 0.34 0.48 0 1 3652 0.26 0.44 28711 0.30 0.46
Intermed. household in-
come
1165 0.34 .48 0 1 3652 0.38 0.49 28711 0.38 0.49
High household income 1165 0.31 0.46 0 1 3652 0.36 0.48 28711 0.32 0.47
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Table 17: Variable Explanation
Variable Explanation Data set
Baseline regression
Dependent variables
Effort pays off 1: respondent states that a high level of effort pays off for the society as well as for oneself ; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89
Luck 1: respondent states that what you achieve in life is mainly a matter of luck ; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1994-96, 1999
GDR media 1: respondent feels (very) well informed about the recent events by GDR press, radio and television; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89
Life GDR 1: respondent likes living in the GDR; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89
Marx-Lenin 1: respondent agrees with Marxist-Leninist world view ; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89
Socialist economies 1: respondent is confident in the economic development of socialist countries up to the year 2000.; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89
Socialist democracy 1: respondent is confident in the development of socialist democracy in the GDR up to the year 2000.; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89
Social security GDR 1: respondent is satisfied with social security in the GDR; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990
Democracy GDR 1: respondent is satisfied with the democracy in the GDR; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990
Life GDR 1: respondent is (totally) satisfied with the general standard of living in the GDR; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1991-94
Happiness 1: respondent is (totally) satisfied with life in general ; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Expected happiness in 5 yrs. 1: respondent expects to be (totally) satisfied with general life in 5 years; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Explanatory variables
Individual-level characteristics
Dresden
1: respondent lives in the district of Dresden; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89
1: respondent has lived in the district of Dresden in 1990; 0: in other parts of the GDR excl. Greifswald-Stralsund GSOEP 1990
Age Age of the respondent GDR 1988/89; GSOEP 1990-99
Female 1: respondent is female; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89; GSOEP 1990-99
Never married 1: respondent has never been married (i.e. is single); 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89; GSOEP 1990-99
Married 1: respondent is married; 0: otherwise GDR 1988/89; GSOEP 1990-99
Widowed or divorced 1: respondent is either widowed or divorced; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89; GSOEP 1990-99
Children 1: respondent has children; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89
No. persons in household Number of persons living in the respondent’s household. GSOEP 1990-99
No. children in household Number of children living in the respondent’s household. GSOEP 1990-99
University 1: respondent has an university degree; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89; GSOEP 1990-99
High education 1: respondent has finished 12th (13th) grade; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89 (GSOEP 1990-99)
Intermed. education 1: respondent has finished 10th (at least 9th) grade; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89 (GSOEP 1990-99)
Low education 1: respondent has finished 8th (9th) grade or left school without a degree; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89 (GSOEP 1990-99)
Farther’s education Level of education of respondent’s farther GSOEP 1990-99
Net income Respondent’s net income: 1 (500 Mark) - 9 (more than 1500 Mark) GDR 1988/89
Log. household income Logarithm of respondent’s yearly real available household income: 0 - 256,099 Euro GSOEP 1992-1999
Self-employed 1: respondent is self-employed; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Civil servant 1: respondent is a civil servant; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Pensioner 1: respondent is a pensioner; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Not employed 1: respondent is not employment; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Unemployed 1: respondent is unemployed; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-99
Unemployment experience Total experience of unemployment until the survey year (in years). GSOEP 1990-99
West Germany 1: respondent currently lives in West Germany; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1991-99
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Table 17: Variable Explanation
Variable Explanation Data set
Regional-level characteristics
Population density Inhabitants per km2 in the respondent’s district GDR Statistical Yearbook 1990
Industrial employment Industrial employment as a share of total employment GDR Statistical Yearbook 1989
Agricultural employment Agricultural employment as a share of total employment GDR Statistical Yearbook 1989
Unemployment rate (state) Unemployment rate in the respondent’s state of residence INKAR (various years)
Robustness tests
Individual-level characteristics
Theater 1: respondent has visited a theater during the past month; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89
Cinema 1: respondent has visited a cinema during the past month; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89
Museum 1: respondent has visited a museum during the past month; 0 otherwise GDR 1988/89
Mother: Catholic 1: respondent’s mother is catholic; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-1990
Mother: Protestant 1: respondent’s mother is protestant; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-1990
Mother: Other 1: respondent’s mother is religious but neither catholic nor protestant; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-1990
Mother: Not religious 1: respondent’s mother is not religious; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-1990
Respondent (1990): Catholic 1: respondent’s stated to be catholic in 1990; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990
Respondent (1990): Protestant 1: respondent’s stated to be protestant in 1990; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990
Respondent (1990): Other 1: respondent’s stated to be religious but neither catholic nor protestant in 1990; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990
Respondent (1990): Not religious 1: respondent’s stated to be not relgious in 1990; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990
Low household income 1: In year 1990 and 1991 and respondent belongs in 1992 to the 25 percent with the lowest household income; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-91
Intermed. household income 1: In year 1990 and 1991 and respondent belongs in 1992 to the 50 percent with the medium household income; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-91
High household income 1: In year 1990 and 1991 and respondent belongs in 1992 to the 25 percent with the highest household income; 0 otherwise GSOEP 1990-91
District-level characteristics
GDR-districts
Industrial production Industrial production of the district as a share of GDR total industrial production GDR Statistical Yearbook 1989
Working age population Working age population as a share of total district population GDR Statistical Yearbook 1989
High educated workers Workers with university degree as a share of district working population Kind(1997)
Border district 1: respondent lives in a district located at the inner-German border; 0 otherwise
Distance to Berlin Distance between the district capital and Berlin (in km)
Theater visitors Number of theater visitors as a percentage of total district population GDR Statistical Yearbook 1989
FRG regional planning units
Population density Inhabitants per km2 in the respondent’s regional planning unit INKAR (various years)
Inhabitants older than 65 Inhabitants older than 65 as a share of total regional population INKAR (various years)
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate in the respondent’s region INKAR (various years)
Average industrial wage Average gross wages in the respondent’s region INKAR (various years)
GDP per capita GDP per capita in the respondent’s region INKAR (various years)
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